As an alternative to approaching Islam as an object for anthropological analysis, this article develops the idea of an anthropologist participating in a conversation going along within an Islamic tradition. The idea of a conversation is developed through the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and his ideal of knowing as a ethical relation with an infinite other. Levinas opposes a sterile and oppressive relation of 'totality'
where the knowing self encompasses the other within concepts and thought that originate in the self, with a critical and creative relation of 'infinity' in which the alterity of the other is maintained and invites conversation that brings the self into I was taken by surprise by the response because this is not a new problem and one I thought had long been resolved. It was the central concern of disciplinary debates in the 1970s and 1980s from which the 'anthropology of Islam' emerged as a subfield.
Those debates revolved around the question of how to frame the diversity in the practice and belief that anthropologists encountered in located communities, groups, and individuals within Islam as a global analytical object. Had I, with the best intentions of respecting the self-presentations of individuals who identified as Muslim, unwittingly drifted back into a stance somewhat similar to that Robert Launay has described as typical of anthropologists prior to these debates (Launay 1992: 2) ; that is, a concern for located ways of perceiving and being that implicitly Levinas's ideal of knowing as a critical, ethical relation with an infinite other. It is an attempt to move away from approaching Islam as our object of study to participating in a conversation going along within an Islamic tradition.
Anthropology of Islam
In his book The Calligraphic State the anthropologist Brinkely Messick writes that a 'central problem in Muslim thought concerns the difficult transition from the unity and authenticity of the Text of God to the multiplicity and inherently disputed quality of the texts of men' (Messick 1993: 16-17) . Messick succinctly expresses the tension between unity and diversity that has produced widely differing approaches to sacred text by Muslims. An anthropology of Islam that confines itself to a study of different approaches to sacred text, how competing understandings and interpretations are debated, contested and enforced would, however, not address the problem I have already alluded to in relation to my own research in Uzbekistan, that is the nonscripturally founded practice and experience that, for many Muslims, contributes understandings of Islam and Muslim selfhood.
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In the 1970s and 1980s much of the debate that attempted to delineate Islam as an object that could be approached ethnographically revolved around questions of system, structure or scale. Islam, it was suggested, should be approached in terms of local historically developed symbolic systems, as Moroccan, Indonesian, or other culturally inflected variants of Islam (Geertz 1968) , as the articulation of a global Islam with local political, economic, and social circumstances (Eickelman 1982; Manger 1999) , or with Gellner's often critiqued idea of Islam as a composite of a scripturally founded Great Tradition and locally specific 'folk' variants (Gellner 1981) .
In contrast to approaches that fashioned an object of Islam as an artefact of the observer's own work of analysis, other anthropologists took Muslims themselves as their starting point in an effort to approach Islam in its own terms. Two contributions that best express this effort are those of Abdul Hamid el-Zein and Talal Asad. ElZein's response to diversity of practice, including that not founded directly on scriptural interpretation, was to advocate a full recognition of the legitimacy of diverse local islams. This position explicitly rejects a distinction between theological and folk Islam in anthropological analysis (el-Zein 1977) . He anticipates Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's more recent call for the 'ontological self-determination of the world's peoples' (Viveiros de Castro 2003) , to which I will return below, in asserting that this categorical distinction privileges scholarly theology, and the anthropological project itself, as being more systematic, reflective, and addressed to ultimate questions of cosmology. For el-Zein, folk and formal theology are both reflections on the unity of God and nature, but while formal theology takes the Divine text of the Qur'an as its starting point, folk theology starts from nature and subsumes the Qur'an within that order. Whatever criticisms might be made of this position, from the standpoint of scripturally grounded interpretation that it legitimates heterodoxy 5 and polytheism, as the respondent to my talk might have argued, or from an anthropological disciplinary position that it makes it impossible to identify Islam as an object of analysis at all, el-Zein encourages anthropologists to take as their starting point the practice and belief of those who identify themselves as Muslim, and he does so from an intelligibly Islamic position of tawḥīd, the unity of God and creation.
Asad's reply in his influential paper The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam is also a call to take Muslims seriously in their own terms. He is equally critical of essentialist distinctions between Great and Little Traditions. At the same time, for Asad Islam cannot be identified as simply anything a Muslim believes or practices. Rather, an anthropology of Islam 'should begin, as Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur'an and the Hadith' (Asad 1986: 14) . The discursive element of this formula pays attention to the relations of power, the institutions and processes through which orthodoxies, visions of an ideal Muslim past, present, and future, are debated and established as hegemonic. Asad's concept of a tradition, which he takes from Alasdair MacIntyre's work on virtue (MacIntyre 2007) , is what locates the anthropological object of study in something distinctively Islamic. The debates, disputes, and struggles over the nature of a Muslim community and person are conducted in terms of shared, historically developed conceptions of Muslim pasts and futures, anchored in the founding sacred texts. With Asad's intervention the disciplinary debates over defining Islam as an analytical object seemed to have run their course. In the following two decades questions of definition were largely put to one side and anthropologists turned their attention to 6 exploring the lives and experiences of Muslims and how Islam is lived. Attention has been focused on the differing and often competing strands of interpretation among Muslims and their efforts to debate and authorise correct practice (eg. Bowen 1993; Horvatich 1994 ). In the 2000s ground breaking works were produced on the topic of piety that not only illuminate the efforts of Muslims to develop moral subjectivities, but decentre concepts at the heart of the idea of secular modernity, such as the primacy of human freedom and the idea of modernity itself (Deeb 2006; Mahmood 2005 (Ewing 1997; Louw 2012) . The question of what anthropologists are actually studying when they engage with Muslims has once more explicitly re-emerged in critiques of an over-emphasis in recent anthropological work on questions of piety (Marsden 2005; Marsden & Retsikas 2013) . In Samuli Schielke's words, there is 'too much Islam in the anthropology of Islam' (Schielke 2010: 2) . The risk Schielke identifies is that of essentialism, presenting a single aspect of the life of a Muslim, those pious moments, as standing for the whole. For the majority, Schielke argues, moral subjectivities are characterised more by ambiguity and diversity of referential frames, than by a neat coherence. Instead, these anthropologists call for attention to be paid to the 'everyday' life and experience of people who happen to be Muslim, to recognise the 'humanity of people on their own terms', to develop a 'grounded and nuanced understanding of what it means to live a life' (Schielke 2010: 5) .
This move has itself provoked the counter-critique that privileging 'everyday Islam' reproduces a secular humanist perspective, that it sets up an opposition between a supposedly natural human condition of scepticism, uncertainty, and freedom, and an exceptional or impossible state of pious conformity to doctrinal norms, which refuses to take seriously those it frames as exceptional pious subjects (Fadil & Fernando 2015) . The anthropology of Islam appears to have returned to the debates of three decades ago, only with a perhaps a more contemporary concern for 'taking seriously' Islam and Muslims. We cannot take some Muslims seriously, it seems, without dismissing the experience and perspective of other Muslims. assimilating the other to the same so that alterity vanishes. This may be effected through the use of a middle term, a thought concept, that reduces the other to a generality that originates in the self. Heideggerian ontology for Levinas reduces others and the world to a relation with Being, absorbed into my own projects. This mode of knowing, 'totiality', is 'identified with the freedom of the knowing being encountering nothing which, other with respect to it, could limit it' (TI: 42).
Critique, by contrast, maintains the distance between self and other. Truth is produced in a conversation with the other where alterity is not overcome or neutralised, nor does alterity present a barrier preventing engagement, but rather the conversation with alterity is the productive source of self-critique. 'The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics' (TI: 43). Freedom is opposed to ethics. The totalising relation is for Levinas not only a tyranny but it is also sterile, it produces nothing but more of the same. The relation of infinity, the overflowing of the self where I am prompted to examine reflexively my normal spontaneous being, is critique that is productive of true knowing. I am drawn beyond myself.
Two objections might be made to Levinas's philosophy with regards to anthropology.
Firstly, his insistence on the essential separation of self from other would seem to be founded on a conception of autonomous personhood that the general direction of anthropological thinking over past decades has called into question. Secondly, is Levinas's philosophy really an expression of Jewish theology that has limited relevance outside a Jewish, or at least a theistic, tradition? Samuel Moyn, who has traced the roots of Levinas's thinking, not only in Jewish writing but also in Protestant theology, argues that Levinas's Other is in fact 'a secularised appeal to the divine, a God, in humanised form' (Moyn 2005: 239) . The human other, rather than God, becomes the transcendent source of Truth.
For Levinas it is the radical uniqueness of the person that establishes the condition of interiority and separation that makes knowing possible. This uniqueness is founded upon our sensuous, embodied immersion in the world, prior to and exceeding our representation of it, that Levinas expresses with the notion of 'enjoyment' (Mensch 2015: 83-6) . Leora Batnitzky has argued that central to Levinas's thought is Descartes's modern subject, separate and independent, although for Levinas interiority is not a product of self-representation in thought but rather of sensual experience (Batnitzky 2004 ). This separation is the condition for the ethical relation.
Our needs, and their bodily satisfaction, establish our uniqueness that can then be escaped in a relation with an other. This in contrast to Heidegger's idea of ontology where our needs, our projects, place us already outside ourselves in the world, excluding the notion of interiority and therefore of ethics in Levinas's terms (Mensch 2015: 44) . The face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched -for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content. (TI: 194) It is through language that the infinity of the other is recognised and maintained:
In discourse the divergence that inevitably opens between the Other as my Categories supposed to be universal are exposed as being the product of contingent cultural or discursive regimes, now identified as located 'western', 'secular', or 'scientific' worldviews. Melford Spiro (1992) has expressed this critical work as a process of translation. Not a direct translation of the Other into the native language of the anthropologist, but rather translation via a third conceptual vocabulary invented by the anthropologist, which both makes the seemingly exotic thought and practice of the Other intelligible after all, and also prompts a re-thinking of the taken-for-grantedness of the world of the anthropologist's audience. A classic example would be Mauss's work on the gift. With a new vocabulary of 'total social phenomena', 'obligation', and 'spirit of the gift', the word and idea of the 'gift' is alienated from 'our' language and becomes a vehicle for comparing radically diverse modes of exchange and the 'social', 'cultural' or 'moral' contexts in which they are embedded.
While the critique that is sought in anthropology's project of 'making the familiar strange and the strange familiar' would seem to be in harmony with Levinas Carrithers's vision recognises that knowledge is grounded in the morally charged relations that the anthropologist develops with others, and that these engender a sense of mutual worth and trust. But his concept of irony is founded on an underlying idea of cultures, worlds, or rationalities that the anthropologist and their others inhabit, albeit as moral agents creatively and intersubjectively acting upon one another rather than mechanically reproducing cultural scripts. Indeed, with something like this in mind I sought to take seriously the subjective experience of interaction with spirits in Uzbekistan, adopting an 'as if' or ironic stance. In doing so I needed to place the experience of those I described rather uncomfortably in a version of the culture concept, which I attempted to soften by presenting as a flexible resource that affords possibilities for perception. Thinking about the experiences of jinn possession in Morocco, I would similarly need to place those individuals within my construction of 'their' culturally produced rationality, and doing so would assume a degree of coherence in their experiences that would be the product of my own intellectual work, my own interpretive 'fiction' as Geertz has put it.
Anthropology in conversation…
The problem of the culture concept is even more evident in much of the recent turn to ontology, a leading proponent of which has been Viveiros de Castro who has posed the question 'What happens if we take native thought seriously?' (Viveiros de Castro 2003) . By this he does not mean representing the Other 'in their own terms'.
Rather, in a position that recalls the spirit of el-Zein's argument, his appeal is to dismantle the model of knowledge production that places the anthropologist in the privileged role of reflexive conceptual thinker, while the native is positioned in a spontaneously inhabited worldview, the raw material for the anthropologist's creative production of universal theory. The concern of anthropology should be with ontology, the conceptual imagination, 'the faculty of creating those intellectual objects and relations which furnish the indefinitely many possible worlds of which humans are capable.' The native is as much engaged in this process as is the anthropologist; in terms of ontology, the anthropologist's and the native's thought are of the same kind.
For many of its proponents the ontological turn represents precisely a move to found a critical knowing in an engagement with alterity (Henare et al. 2007) , but the question is how this alterity is imagined. Viveiros de Castro's representation of an 'Amerindian multinaturalism' has been criticised as being a generalised, overly coherent depiction that is the artefact of the anthropologist's own thought (Bessire & Bond 2014; Ramos 2012) . For there to be a native ontology there needs to be a The problem of the object is one that Ingold addresses in his call for anthropology to be not a study of people but a way of studying with people (Ingold 2008; Ingold & Lucas 2007) . 'Anthropology of' for Ingold tends to transform anything anthropology encounters into an object amenable to analysis in its own analytical terms; as social relations or cultural production of meaning. Ingold focuses particularly on encounters with material objects such as artworks or buildings. Where Levinas, whose thought developed in the experience of Nazi Germany, sees the totalising relation as one of domination and tyranny, Ingold sees the problem as an inability to engage with the creative processes that bring these objects into being. In common with Viveiros de Castro, Ingold recognises people as engaged in the same enterprise as anthropologists. Not in terms of the ontologies or conceptual worlds they create, but on the level of practice. We are all engaged in doing anthropology for Ingold, we are commonly 'concerned with exploring, interpreting and describing the worlds we inhabit, the ways we perceive them' (Ingold & Lucas 2007: 291) As an individual, I am no more reducible to a naturalist or secular ontology than the Moroccans I met are reducible to any Islamic ontology or vernacular theology that I would have to infer from my understanding of their experience. This is not to say that ideologies or discourses that could be described as secular, scientific, modernist, or Islamic in one form or another do not exist, do not have effects, nor that they should not be examined. Just that, following Levinas, individuals always exceed the limits of any concept and should not be subsumed within them. In practical terms this will mean a much closer engagement with the academic discipline of Islamic studies than has been typical in the past for anthropologists. Not only does this discipline make much of the Islamic textual tradition of theology and philosophy accessible to non-specialists, but its mode of knowing is often one that I have been arguing is central to anthropology as a disciplinary project. As Henry Corbin, a prominent scholar of Ibn al-'Arabī has put it:
To our mind the best explanation of Ibn 'Arabī remains Ibn 'Arabī himself.
The only means of understanding him is to become for a moment his disciple, to approach him as he himself approached many masters of Ṣūfism. (Corbin 1969: 5) What I am proposing is an explicit, conscious stepping away from making our 
